ANNOUNCER: (MUSIC) -- Walter Lippmann is seventy-one years old. One year ago, America's most distinguished newspaperman, whose column appears in the New York Herald Tribune and more than two hundred other newspapers, made his television debut in a one-hour conversation on Leadership. The Louisville Courier Journal called it a television landmark, and many newspapers stated, editorially, that Lippmann should be an annual television event. In the past few months, Mr. Lippmann has had private conversations with Premier Khrushchev, President de Gaulle, Prime Minister Macmillan, and President Kennedy, and we at CBS REPORTS are delighted to welcome him back to what we hope has become a television tradition. Now, from Washington, here is Mr. Lippman and CBS Chief Washington correspondent, Howard K. Smith.

SMITH: In a column about a year ago, you said in regard to the qualities a good President should have, the first thing is his ability to see through to what is permanent and enduring. This second sight is the quality of great leaders. Do you think that Kennedy has that second sight?

LIPPMANN: I think he's capable of having it. And when -- if we get into this more, perhaps we'll show where he showed

some weaknesses in that respect. But I think it's too early to say that he has or hasn't got them.

SMITH: Well, what has President Kennedy demonstrated so far?

LIPPMANN: What he has done in the four or five months is, first, to put -- is first of all, to carry on in all its essentials the Eisenhower economic philosophy and the Eisenhower international commitments, and never explaining to the country that those can be changed. It's like the Eisenhower administration thirty years younger. Well, that's the way he started, but in the meantime, he really doesn't -- that isn't the way he's going to go. He's been -- not moving in a new direction but changing the direction in which he's going to move. Now, I think that in the next year, he will make the great decision, whether he can afford to balance the budget in the Eisenhower sense and allow the economy to remain at a fairly quiet level; or whether he wants to give it a real push upward by tax reduction and measures like that. That's going to be decided in the coming months. And a weakness of Kennedy is that he never explained these things to the American people.

SMITH: Now, Mr. Nixon has said that; Senator Fulbright has said that, and you have said that. Yet, he's one of our most -- he's spoken more than Mr. Eisenhower did.

LIPPMANN: I know - but he hasn't explained. He has not explained them. He has not explained what his economic challenge is, and what it's going to require in the way of much stronger measures of -- in regard to tax reduction -- probably government spending and credit action. He never explained why, if he wants to do all these things such as fight the cold war and win it, really outdo the Communists, it's got to be done at full blast to the American economy, with a production of fifty billions more than we produced this year. He needs that money to do that. That's never been explained to our people, so they have no sense of urgency. And he has never explained to them the very unpleasant fact which he didn't create - it's not his fault - that we have moral commitments and legal commitments around -- mainly around the rim of Asia, which were built up before he took office and when we were the supreme military power in the world. And coming down from being supreme to being only equal is an awful wrench for every country, and it makes people frustrated and angry and they don't think it ought to be true, and so on, and it's a hard thing to swallow, but that's what he's going to have to do.

SMITH: Well, can you understand why he has not communicated? He's an extremely articulate President. He seems to

know the value of television. He's made a great many speeches. Yet he doesn't seem to have got his case across and there's a great deal of confusion in America as to what we're about.

LIPPMANN: Well, I put it to this -- that he's a very quick and intelligent man, himself. Reads very fast, understands very fast, and it bores him to explain things. He hasn't got the patience. He ought to have the patience that a teacher must have, who is willing to start where the pupil or the hearer is, and explain it step by step from what he -- he tells them what it is at the end, and he likes to make decisions and announce them, but he doesn't explain them.

SMITH: Well, Mr. Lippmann, I'd like to ask you something that I think is basic. Is it possible that a free, loose-jointed, easy-going society like the American democracy can compete with a tightly concentrated, tightly controlled, secret dictatorship like that of the Soviet Union and Red China?

LIPPMANN: Well, that's the dream of our age. That's the question, and that is why many of us think that the Kennedy administration has to get going and moving rapidly, or we won't be able to do it. I don't -- I wouldn't like, for a moment, to underestimate how formidable this

competition is and this threat. It's very formidable, and when you see people running around this country, and wanting to abolish the income tax and turn the Federal government back into a Confederation of States, you despair of the possibility of persuading them to do what we're going to have to do, and what we're going to have to do is going to take a lot of money, and it's going to take a very strong government.

SMITH: Well, if Mr. Kennedy set himself one main goal in the election campaign, it was to resurrect America's fallen prestige. Do you think that in his legislative program he is doing the right things necessary to that end?

LIPPMANN: He's -- I don't believe he's really got started doing that, because he is not sure of himself. Because he's conscious of his small majority; because he's conscious that he hasn't got a really effective working majority in Congress for important measures, and because, I take it, that he judges that the mood of the country is not in favor of doing the things which would really create a new sense of prestige, because in the last analysis, American prestige depends not on arms, although we must have arms. It depends on the example we set to the world, and if we set the example of a very brilliantly active economy and society, in which we were

dealing with all our problems actively, our prestige would rise in the world.

SMITH: Well, in the President's speech the other night, the only thing that he appealed to the American people about, was to give support to his program for foreign aid. Now, judging from the mood on Capitol Hill, this is not a good year for foreign aid. Lots of previous supporters are criticizing it, and this is the year in which Laos, which we heavily aided, has gone over to the adversary, and which South Korea, which we aided even more heavily, has abandoned democracy. Is there a good case in favor of foreign aid that isn't being made?

LIPPMANN: I would say that the United States can no more refuse to contribute to foreign aid, in the world, than the richest man in town can refuse to contribute to the community chest. You just can't live in the world community -- we couldn't live refusing to aid anybody. Now, the nature of the method of aiding is very debatable. And I hope and believe that -- that there is a movement on foot to reform some of its worst abuses. It is true, as some of the liberal critics in the Congress have been saying, that a lot of this money, as in Laos, which is a peculiarly bad case of how the thing failed -- a lot of this money simply enriched the

upper class who exploited, who flaunted their riches all over, and increased the hatred of the poor for the rich. And that made them very fertile ground for Communist propaganda. In other places, we've undoubtedly spent much too much money on armies that have no military value whatsoever from the point of view of our interests, but are kept there, are paid for by us, in order to keep them loyal to the king or ruler of the country so they won't overthrow us. Those are great abuses. On the other hand, if we are not going -- if the world isn't going to go into that landslide into Communism, which Khrushchev predicts, there have to be anchor points in all the continents, which show that prosperity and a certain amount of social justice can be achieved by another way than the Communist way. And that means that you must focus your energy, your aid on key countries. Now, if you ask me what they are - the key country in Asia is India. If India can be made to work as a successful, democratic state, the influence of that will spread all over Southeast Asia, no matter who takes over in Laos in the next few months, and all over Indonesia and all over. The key country in Latin America is not Cuba. It's Brazil. And I don't know - I would hesitate to say just which is the key country in Africa, but I imagine it might be Nigeria. And I think in those cases, we ought to focus our aid, not

necessarily stopping this other aid, which is really a form of bribery to keep them quiet, but focus it and do enough to do it. There's no use building half a bridge across a river - you've got to build a whole bridge.

SMITH: Now, you've made that point about foreign aid very strongly, and what impresses me is, that the President, in talking to the American people and calling on them for action, did not make it as strongly.

LIPPMANN: Well, I -- you've just talked about the conclusion of the speech, which dealt with foreign aid. I would say that that showed some of his defects as a political leader. He talked to the American people as if they were suffering from some terrible burden in foreign aid where they are not suffering from any burden. He should have told them, considering how grim the outlook is, that that was the first installment, and a very small one, of what they're going to have to pay, and that they mustn't think that they can just cut it down and have everything just the way they like it in the world. One of the great difficulties he runs into is, that in the public mind is what's talked about spending, and he doesn't want to be labeled a spender, and he's quite right. I mean, that's politically poison. But you see, the public mind, it's -- they'll have to get over it

and learn better. If, let's say, if a man borrows money from a bank to build a movie house, or a dance hall, that is investment. If the city spends money to build a schoolhouse, that's spending. And that's wicked. Now, actually, we're about the only government in the world that keeps its accounts in this way - the only government in the world that doesn't distinguish between public spending and public investment - and that has to be cleared up. I don't know how to do it, but I think ...

SMITH: Well, as long as the President fears the label "Spender" and doesn't explain it, won't we always remain with this?

LIPPMANN: That's true. That is undoubtedly true. And he is haunted by this thing that Eisenhower probably could have been elected this time if he'd run again. And that - that's what the country believes.

SMITH: Well, some people see our salvation is not in what we do, but what happens to the Communists. Now, Charles Bohlen, who's probably our outstanding Soviet expert in the State Department, made a speech a short while ago, in which he said that if we can just hold things for another ten years, Russian Communism may lose its aggressive revolutionary momentum the way Islam did in

the Middle Ages, and we may be able, then, to get along with it. Do you find any consolation in that thought?

LIPPMANN: Well, I would think it was dangerous to find consolation in that thought. I hope that'll be true, but that is a little bit like Khrushchev's inevitability doctrine in reverse, and I don't think things are inevitable. I think men have to act to make the inevitable happen.

SMITH: Now, this is the second time you've met Khrushchev in Russia, and I think you've met him, here, in the United States as well. Could you give us an assessment of him? Could you measure him against some American public figure?

LIPPMAN: I've been asked that by a number of people, and the only trouble is that everybody -- the man who he most reminds me of is not known well enough to people today - it's too long ago - but that was Governor Alfred Smith of New York. They have these things in common. Smith had an enormous instinctive sense of what every man in his constituency - New York - New York City - was thinking. Khrushchev has that. He's got antennae all over the place. He has the capacity to talk to them, and Smith had, about the most difficult subjects, the economy, and how to do it, and make them think it's funny and interesting. Al Smith used to go down to the

Bowery when he was Governor of New York, and make a speech explaining the budget of New York State, than which there couldn't be anything more uninteresting, and he'd have them in roars of laughter. Well, that -- Khrushchev has that quality, and then he has -- I think that is the key to Khrushchev - that he is a politician and he would have been a successful politician in any country. He's not like Stalin - a sort of oriental despot who works in the back with cloak and dagger. The President and he ought to come to some common feeling, because they're both politicians.

SMITH: Well, now they've met. Do you think that these two politicians did achieve some common feeling? It's hard to detect any from what the President said on television the other day.

LIPPMANN: I think the common feeling they've achieved is a realization of the terrible danger that they both run. If the -- their differences are allowed to bring them to the point of up some dead end street, where there's no choice for one or the other, or both, except surrender or a suicidal war, that's the common thing they've got.

SMITH: Now, the President, in his speech to the people, afterwards, said that the most somber aspect of the talks was the discussion about Germany and Berlin.

LIPPMANN: Oh well, I think there's no doubt at all that the central problem is Germany and Berlin, and that all these other things they discussed -- Laos and nuclear testing and disarmament, and the general movement of Communism in the uncommitted lands, are all related to this central issue, which is the focus of the cold war. That's the focal point where, if there's going to be a third World War, it will come. Khrushchev said, when I talked to him, he said, "I would agree to a United Germany if it were Communist." He said, "But you won't agree to that - and I won't agree to a United

Germany if it has to give up Communism and become like Adenauer's Germany. So "he said, "there's no possibility of uniting them." In fact, on that, there is a curious agreement between Khrushchev and de Gaulle, for instance. Khrushchev and Macmillan. We have always adhered to the idea that Germany ought eventually to be reunited. But we don't press it because we know it's not practical. Now, at the same time, there are left in Berlin, in West Berlin, two and a half million Germans, who are not Communists at all; who are very anti-Communist; whose sympathies; whose ties; whose economic connections; whose culture; whose everything is with the West, and who are democratic people, and we have an absolutely unquestioned obligation of honor, and to see that they are not crushed, or not enslaved, or not starved out, or anything else.

SMITH: Well, could you summarize on the basis of your conversation with Khrushchev what he wants and what he would be willing to negotiate about regarding Berlin?

LIPPMANN: All I can tell you is that Khrushchev says he wants to negotiate. When it came to negotiations he might stall, as we've had -- as we know from the experience with the nuclear test ban and everything else. But I would not pass up the chance to do that -- if we can negotiate with the Soviet Union a new treaty which guarnatees the future of Germany -- of Berlin. It specifies what roads

shall always be open to it - what airports - what harbors - what canals - all that spelled out in great detail and signed by the Four Powers who occupy Germany - by the two Germanies, and that's one of the rubs, because that's what the West Germans don't want - but signed by the East Germans. I don't think the thing would be good unless you got their signature, and registered at the United Nations. Then, in addition to that, there will have to remain in Berlin for some time to come, British, French and American troops. He does demand that if American and French and British troops are to stay, then, Russians troops should also be there, and that they all should be there in very small amounts. I mean, they should be symbolic, which is, after all, all they are anyway. And my own view is, that the thing he wants more than anything else, and I'd like to tell you why he wants it, I think, He wants to give legal status to the East German state. He said to me, "I know you wouldn't recognize the East German state. That is, I mean, we wouldn't have an ambassador from the East German state. We wouldn't send an ambassador to it. But it would be allowed to sign the document, which would give it a certain recognition and it's what's called in diplomacy de facto recognition.

SMITH: Yes. Well, if what Mr. Rusk mentioned takes place, that is a crisis is provoked in the summer or fall, and the Russians hand over control of our communications with

Berlin to the East German puppets, what would you be in favor of doing?

LIPPMANN: Well, as I understood Khrushchev, separate peace treaty is a last resort. He doesn't want to do it. He said that half a dozen times -- "I don't want the tension. I know it'll create tension. I want to avoid it. But in the last run, I've got to do it." And I'll tell you, if you like, later why he thinks he's got to do it.

SMITH: Could you tell me now?

LIPPMANN: Yes. I asked him -- I had been asked to ask him by an American authority whom I won't identify, but a friend of mine. He said, "See if you can find out whether he wouldn't, at least, be willing to have a standstill - that is, leave everything where it is for, say, five years. In five years, we'd all be older and wiser and a lot of things can happen, and we've cooled off, and maybe then, we can negotiate, but it's all very difficult to negotiate now - what with the German elections and all these things." Well, I tried that on him, and I said, "Why are you in such a hurry?" And he said, "I'm in a hurry because I want the frontiers of Germany, and the status of Berlin, and the demarcation line between the two German states settled in a treaty before" - and then he said, "before Hitler's generals in West

Germany get the atomic bomb." And he said, "They're going to get it. They've already being trained how to use it. They haven't got the warheads, but they're going to get it, and they surely will get in in four or five years. And they'll get it from you, or they'll get it from the French, who'll be able to make them by that time. And if that comes, then the great danger for Europe exists, because either by their attacking East Germany and overrunning East Berlin -- or the other way around, that the East Germans rise and they go to their defense -- either way, there'll be nothing to stop it. Nobody will have any agreements. You won't intervene - and there we'll be with a very dangerous war on our hands. So, we must have a treaty first. And that is what I'm pressing for. But I want to get those frontiers fixed so that if either Germany moves, in a military sense, in the next four or five years, it will be the aggressor." Now, that's his argument and that's why he's in a hurry.

SMITH: Well, what's the next step? What do we do now?

LIPPMANN: Well, I think, of course, the next step is one which involves a change in our basic approach to the German problem. We have taken the line, conventionally, that everything in Berlin is as good as it could be from our point of view; that any change in the situation of Berlin

would be for the worse. Therefore, we must stand firm and stand pat. That's Dr. Adenauer's view. Change nothing - fight - threaten to fight if anything is changed. Don't negotiate. It can't be negotiated. You'll only weaken it. Now, the other view, which is the one I share, is that the situation in Berlin is not good - that it's -- Berlin is in a state of chronic crisis, which means on the Russian side, Soviet side, that any time that Khrushchev wants to put on a little pressure, he could just turn the screw a little bit in Berlin, and the whole world is focused on Berlin, while something's going on in Iran or Cuba or heaven knows where. That is very disadvantageous to the West. The other thing is, that I don't believe the people of Berlin, West Berlin, or of Germany, believe the present situation is good, because the reason -- because they come back to us every few months, and demand that we should again cross our hearts and swear that we will go to war for Berlin. And if they were sure of it -- if they didn't think it was something that couldn't last forever, they wouldn't feel -- wouldn't be doing that. I think our position should be not that any change in the guarantees of the rights of the people of Berlin is a defeat and a surrender, but that those guarantees should be improved, if it's possible to improve them.

They're not very good today. We should say -- we should take the postion that the freedom of Berlin, in the sense of their ability to govern themselves, to live their own life, to keep their physical and economic and spiritual and political contacts with the Western world, cannot be touched. We won't negotiate about that, but the legal basis and the statutory rights that go with that, are negotiable. They never were negotiated. The thing is all a blotter of catch-can -- the things made by generals and various people, and we ought to say to the -- I would like to see the position of saying to Khrushchev, we don't like Berlin the way it is. We want to improve it, and if you can negotiate with us an improvement, we'll be very interested.

SMITH: Well, people who say that you can't reach an agreement with the Russians generally cite the fate of the nuclear test ban talks in Geneva. The President sounded very pessimistic about that. Khrushchev doesn't seem, now, to want any agreement on it. How do you explain that?

LIPPMANN: We talked quite a lot about the nuclear test, and my explanation will have to be my guess, but the fact is that he's clearly not terribly interested in it. Now, there are several possible explanations, and they may, all of them, be true. One is, part of the agreement would have to be that China would be included and he may

not be able to deliver China. I think -- I'm inclined to think that has a large -- a good deal to do with it, because he talks about our not being able to deliver France. But I think that's his way of saying that he can't deliver China, because when he talked about France to me, he said, "Well, what's the good of an agreement if France doesn't sign it she'll test for you? You'll just ask her to go and test them in the Sahara Desert." And I said, "And China will test for you." And he sort of looked slightly amused, because he likes to be challenged sometimes, and he said, "That's a fair question, but China isn't able to test yet." He thinks the weapons they've got are really good enough. And while we seem to be very interested in developing bigger weapons that weigh less, he has these enormous rockets. I don't think that's a practical problem for him.

SMITH: Well, I'd like to talk to you now about the latest Russian diplomatic creation, and that is what Mr. Mikoyan called the "Troika" System of control. Well, that is that almost everything, nuclear test bans and the United Nations and everything else be controlled by three people. One, a westerner, one a Communist and one a neutral, and each of those has a veto. Now, if that is applied, wouldn't that stagnate all international activity?

LIPPMANN: Yes. It's a fairly recent dogma. Troika, you know, comes from a Russian thing where three horses pull a cart or a sleigh, and if one horse sits down and then the two can't move. I didn't speak to Mr. Khrushchev about this particular point, but I did to a very close advisor of his, a Soviet official. I said, "Why three?" He said, "Well, we really mean two." He said, "We really mean that everything must be done by agreement between the United States and the U.S.S.R. We brought in the third because they're there. They have no power, of course, but they're there and it looks better to include them."

SMITH: Well, does this not threaten the entire future of the United Nations?

LIPPMANN: Yes. The future of the United Nations is very much threatened by the fact that although Mr. Hammarskjold has another two years I think, he couldn't be re-elected at present, and nobody else like him could be elected, and there's quite a good chance that if there is no understanding reached with the Russians on this point, which is -- I wouldn't regard it as inflexible. It's negotiable, but I don't know how negotiable. There just won't be a Secretary General, and if there's no Secretary General, the U.N. will be reduced to a debating

society, or the Security Council will meet, and -- but it won't be able to order anything.

SMITH: Well, in addition to Russian intransigence, there's another change in the United Nations, and that is the admission of a very great number of brand new nations, the leaders of many of which have shown themselves to be not very responsible and to be highly volatile. Isn't it dangerous for the United States to leave our fate to be decided by a body in which these people have the balance of power?

LIPPMANN: You know, Khrushchev pointed that out to me, and he said, "Now you don't want a veto, because you still think you have a majority, and you can elect the Secretary General, and so on, and you'll -- it'll be all favorable to you, but pretty soon you won't be able to elect a majority, and then you'll wish you had a veto. So, in the end, you're going to want just what we want.

ANNOUNCER: CBS REPORTS - "Walter Lippmann 1961" - will continue with Cuba, the C.I.A. and Laos, right after this pause for station identification.

ANNOUNCER: CBS REPORTS - "Lippmann 1961." Here is Howard K. Smith.

SMITH: Well, Mr. Lippmann, we haven't talked yet about NATO. Now, in a recent column, you said that the basis for our difficulties with de Gaulle is the fact that he does not believe that America can be depended upon as a protector of Western Europe.

LIPPMANN: His view is that with modern and nuclear weapons, are so destructive that it's suicide even for the biggest country to be attacked. Therefore, no country will risk being attacked for any other country. There'd always be the hope, well, I will stay out of this and let it go by me. Therefore, he says, the old idea of NATO, which was born before the nuclear weapons, before both sides had nuclear weapons, while we alone had it, is out of date. It cannot be depended upon. Now, the situation is such that if -- which I don't think is likely at all -- but if the Soviets were going to use a nuclear weapon, they would have to strike the United States first, and then they might strike other points in Europe, where there are American nuclear bases. And he doesn't want France to be in the line of fire. He

also wants to have France able, on its own, to be sufficiently dangerous -- too hot to handle is really the de Gaulle policy for France. Where our hope with de Gaulle lies, is in finding a way to agree with him on the fact that nothing great in the world, nothing that might involve nuclear weapons shall be done without full consultation in advance. That's what he wants. He's afraid that we won't protect him. He is also afraid that we'll start a war in which he'll be involved. And I'm sorry to say, or maybe I should -- anyway, it is a fact that he has not got a high opinion of American military leadership or political leadership.

SMITH: Well now, I wonder if Mr. de Gaulle's appraisal of American leadership is changed since he met President Kennedy. I noticed that in one of his toasts at a dinner, he said, "I now have more confidence in your country."

LIPPMANN: Well, I think that there was a -- I think President Kennedy made a strong, personal impression on him as certainly General de Gaulle made on the President, and the personal relationship of those two men is better than the personal relationship between any head of the French government and the American government has been, I would say, since before World War II. I would say

that the utmost that any one can say, with any reasonable certainty, is that he feels that in President Kennedy, he has a man who is capable of understanding his military views. I think he felt, beforehand, that he was up against a stone wall, and wouldn't be listened to.

SMITH: Now, the most mysterious of all the events that have happened is the Cuban debacle. Now, how could a decision like that go through our best military minds, and be okayed by the Chiefs of our Intelligence - be okayed by the brilliant men who surround Kennedy in the White House and the experts in the State Department, and get past the President, himself? That's still a mystery to me.

LIPPMANN: I think the answer you come to is, that the advice to go ahead, the green light for doing it, or the energy demanding that we go ahead, all came from senior advisors. The junior advisors, the men who've come to Washington with Kennedy were not strong enough, perhaps not wise enough, all of them, although some may have been, to tell the President to overrule people with such eminence as the people who advised him to do it. I think, there, he didn't feel that he knew enough to overrule the C.I.A. - the Chiefs of Staff - what there was of the State Department and so on.

SMITH: Well, I suppose when you think that Abraham Lincoln, perhaps our greatest President, took almost two years before he dared to fire his general, whom he thought was not doing his duty, then Kennedy's behavior is quite understandable.

LIPPMANN: I think that he's a man who can learn. I think he'd learned that more than any other thing from Cuba.

SMITH: Well, just after the Cuban fiasco, President Kennedy paid a visit to General MacArthur, and General MacArthur is said to have told the President -- a lot of chickens are coming home to roost and you're in the chicken coop. Do you believe it's true that most of these problems were situations the President inherited and has not had time, really, to correct or to change?

LIPPMANN: Laos is an inheritance. We got into that. If we mismanaged it, which I think we did, the consequences have come now. That's certainly not Kennedy's fault. If he's to be criticized about that, he can be criticized either one way or the other -- either by the people who think we should go to war about Laos, or by the people who say that he should never have promised to defend it. Cuba is a -- was a wrong and a foolish thing to do. It was wrong in itself. It was foolishly handled. If it had succeeded, it probably would have

been worse than if -- since it failed, because if it had succeeded, the utmost that was hoped for was that they'd get these fourteen hundred men ashore and that they'd be able to stay there. Then, we'd have had a civil war which might have dragged on for weeks and weeks, with everybody getting involved in it, and no end to it.

SMITH: Well, now, what should we do about Cuba and Castro?

LIPPMANN: The thing that put Castro over all in right perspective was a thing that Senator Fulbright said in the private discussions beforehand, which is that Castro is a thorn in our flesh but he's not a dagger in our hearts. The question is, is Cuba a military threat to the United States in view of the fact that it is so closely connected with the Soviet Union? I would say to that, that if it were, and I would call the establishment of a missile base or a submarine base, in Cuba, as marking a threat. I think we must keep the thing under really close watch, and it's perfectly easy to do. It's only fair to say, there, that up to this point, there is no evidence of any Soviet military base in Cuba. Mr. Allen Dulles told me, himself, not long ago, that in the invasion there were no Russian planes; that those planes

that Castro used were old American planes. There is not a sign of a missile base, and of course, it stands to reason they can shoot missiles from Siberia to the moon, why should they shoot them ninety -- why should they come ninety miles away? Anyway, we'd match that. The next danger of Castro is, that through his embassies in Latin America, there is a funnel through which propaganda agents -- propaganda and agents and money gotten from the Soviet Union or China, or somewhere, can be pushed into these various countries of South America, and the subversive propaganda supported. That is a problem about which we can't do anything. We can't break up the relations between, let's say Brazil and Cuba. That's up to Brazil. But there's nothing to prevent us from watching it. Our counter-intelligence ought to be good enough to detect a good deal of it, and we ought to keep on supplying the evidence to these governments of what's happening. But the biggest danger of Castro is the one -- much the biggest -- bigger than all these others, is that he might succeed in Cuba, in solving problems which have not yet been solved in a great many South American -- Latin American countries. That's where we have to compete with him. If he can succeed there and our friends and other Latin Americans fail, then his example

is a far more dangerous than anything he himself can do.

SMITH: Do you think we're on the right path towards meeting that threat?

LIPPMANN: I think we are. I think that President Kennedy's alliance for progress, as he calls it, a rather fancy name for helping, is basically right.

SMITH: Well, now, the statements of most politicians come back to haunt them later, and in Kennedy's case, many have come back very quickly. He was opposed to summit diplomacy very strongly before he was President. He was opposed to itinerant diplomacy, and yet his own men have been traveling quite a bit lately. He spoke extremely firmly about us taking a stand on Laos, which we did not take, and in fact, on Cuba. Does this indicate a quality of impulsiveness or is it standard for political statements and political behavior?

LIPPMANN: Well, you take them in order. On the traveling, except for a day or two in Canada, which you really can't call traveling, they're our close neighbors. This is the trip that he made in June to Paris and Vienna and London is really his first trip out of the country. When you come to Dean Rusk, Secretary Rusk, there's a wholly

different tale to be told, and that is a long story, I think.

SMITH: Rusk has traveled more in the same period of time, I gather, than John Foster Dulles did?

LIPPMANN: Yes. ~~And that has involved consequences which I think are quite serious. He had made, I think, a very critical mistake in the handling of his office, and that is, contrary to all that he believed when he came in, he's become a treveling~~ diplomat. Now, the trouble with being a traveling diplomat if you're Secretary of State is, that somebody else has to run the State Department. And he isn't such a wonderful diplomat that he, alone, can do these things. So, I think he's lost the best of both worlds, so to speak. Now, in the case of John Foster Dulles - he traveled and he didn't pay attention to the Secretary -- the State Department. He paid very little attention to it, and he let it go its own way, and he didn't give it any power. But then, he -- the reason he did that was that he had another foreign service which operated for him, and that was his brother's Central Intelligence - C.I.A.

SMITH: Well, what about the C.I.A.? Can a democracy operate an effective intelligence and espionage service?

LIPPMANN: Well, Central Intelligence, you know, is a great, big grab bag of all kinds of things, and in general, I would say absolutely indispensable to have intelligence agencies - and it has to do - it has to spy - it has to counter-spy, which is just almost as important as spying. It has to do a lot of operations which wouldn't look very well in print, but which every country does, such as occasionally slipping something to a politician in a very backward country, or helping an editor who'll change his mind in a backward country. And it's all very immoral, but there's no use pretending that it isn't going to be done. The trouble with C.I.A. has been, I think -- I should have said, one thing is very doubtful - whether it should ever mount expeditions like the Cuban expedition, thats so big you can't keep it secret, and therefore, it's bound to fail. But really secret things are an inevitable part of government. What they did in the C.I.A. was to take all these things and put them in one thing -- everything focused on the head of one man, who never knew whether he was trying to tell the President what was the truth about something or other, or what ought to be done, and there ought to be no connection between the two.

SMITH: Well, just after the Cuban debacle, you said that the Joint Chiefs and the head of the C.I.A. had to go. Do you still feel that way?

LIPPMANN: I do. I think it's going to be done too - I hope with as little bloodshed as possible, but I think the C.I.A., itself, may disappear and be dissolved into its parts taken over in different directions.

SMITH: Well, in all these setbacks in which the C.I.A. has been involved, the President, in a speech, has implied, and many of his aides have said, quite frankly to us reporters, in private, that they consider the press to be a limitation on our effectiveness in carrying out policy -- a free press unrestrained. What do you think about that? Do you agree with that?

LIPPMANN: They're very confused about all that. I think, in some ways, the press -- there are some things the press might do better or differently or not at all than it does. But what they were complaining about was something that they have -- there's no criticism being made of it, namely that the Cuban expedition was -- that the news of that was published to the world before it

happened. I consider it the duty of the press to expose that kind of thing to the light of day, because I don't think a democracy like this should have a secret training camps and secret armies and secret navies in foreign countries -- all in violation of its treaties and its own laws.

SMITH: You once said that one of the proudest achievements of your career was that you once exposed an incident like that. Could you tell me what that was?

LIPPMANN: Well, that was many years ago when there was a grave threat of the invasion of Mexico, yes, in the Twenties.

SMITH: And what did you do?

LIPPMANN: Well, I was editor of the New York World, and we shrieked and howled about it much more than anybody has done about Cuba, and I think we had some effect. I think we had the effect of stopping it.

SMITH: Well, to me, the chief paradox of the time we live in is, that most of the resources and the skills and the wealth of the world are with the Western nations; yet, the Communist nations appear to be winning the competition we call the cold war. How do you explain that?

LIPPMANN: I think that's an exaggeration, really, and somewhat of an optical illusion. They are winning it in the most backward and reactionary places, but I don't consider that they're winning it in -- they are not winning it in Europe. In spite of Castro, I don't believe they're going to win it in Brazil, which is going to be determined more than anything else what happens in South America.

They haven't won it in Mexico. I think that one -- they haven't won it in Japan. The fact that the Japanese are not -- don't love Americans doesn't mean that they're Communists.

SMITH: Well, the one question on which Khrushchev and the President seemed less pessimistic than on other questions was on Laos. Yet, recent events don't seem to have borne out that relative optimism. What do you think about that?

LIPPMANN: I think the answer is that Laos is not a primary vital interest to the Soviet Union. Khrushchev regards it as quite secondary, and it's not a primary interest to the United States either. It's a country which is remote, very difficult to get at, very unsuited to American military type of American power - military power. There are no roads in it, no ports, no airfields, and I think that it's a wise thing for a country to measure its -- to tailor its policy to its military powers.

SMITH: Well, do you believe in what's called the Domino theory, and that is that if we lose Laos, then we'll lose Thailand, and so on, until we've lost all Southeast Asia because of this one country?

LIPPMANN: I remember the Domino theory first was brought up in the Middle East, and I remember when people said Nasser made a deal with the Soviets about arms, and they said, "Ah, Egypt's gone" - then Syria was gone, and then Iraq. None of them is gone, and I don't consider Laos gone. Laos is not going to be what we rather foolishly, I think, two or three years ago, tried to make it - an American satellite, whatever you like to call it. I mean, putting in a government that suited us - and that is not possible.

SMITH: Well, Mr. Lippmann, in the course of our long conversation in which we've ranged over many subjects, you have been opposed to taking action, military, forceful action in Laos, or unilateral action in Cuba. You have said you're in favor of negotiations over Berlin, which may involve making concessions to the Russians over Berlin. What would be your answer to those who would say that this is a policy of appeasement?

LIPPMANN: My answer to that would be that you can't decide these questions of life and death for the world by epithets like appeasement. Furthermore, I think the reasons for doing what I advocate, are based on the soundest, strategical principle, and that is this: The Soviet Union is not engaged in any of these places. It hasn't sent its troops anywhere. As long as it isn't engaged,

we mustn't be engaged. We must always keep the central power, which is the ultimate deterrent to the future - to war by the Soviet Union intact, as long as they're intact, but if we get ourselves involved in a Korean war in Indo-China, and all our reserves begin flowing that way, or get ourselves involved in a thing we can't finish in Cuba, because the guerrilla war may go on forever, then we will weaken ourselves for what is really the issue, which is to keep the balance of power between ourselves and the Soviet Union intact, and that's the principle on which -- that's the principle I have in the back of my mind in taking a position about not intervening in Laos, for example. I don't agree with the people who think that we have to go out and shed a little blood to prove we're virile men. This is too serious a business for that kind of thinking, and in regard to Cuba, my feeling was not only that, but also that we had no -- it was illegal for us to do it, and we cannot go into the business of violating treaties. We're not that kind of country. And then behind that all, lies a very personal and human feeling -- that I don't think old men ought to promote wars for young men to fight. I don't like warlike old men. I think it's their business to try as best they can, by whatever wisdom they can find, to avert what would be an absolutely irreparable calamity for the world.

(MUSIC) --

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